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 of our knowledge of the children's book trade in the century after John Newbury. It adds a
 few names to a familiar list, but partakes of the same antiquarianism as earlier scholarship.
 Jackson does usually avoid the anachronistic standards of judgment and the limited sympa-
 thies that warped former histories. One can hope that the work will inspire interest in this
 amazing subject, even if it does not ask very searching questions about authors or readers.
 University of Florida C. JOHN SOMMERVILLE
 David Lieberman. The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-
 Cenitury Britain. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1989. Pp. xiv, 312. $44.50.
 David Lieberman's lucid and sure-footed reinterpretation of late-eighteenth- and early-
 nineteenth-century jurisprudence is original, thoughtful, analytically acute, and a pleasure
 to read. Lieberman argues that Bentham's law reform ideas must be viewed in relation to
 earlier (and contemporary) reform traditions. Bentham's views were more complex than the
 long-held myth would have it, partly because they were more derivative, at least in his early
 enterprises, combining as they did a reception of earlier notions with the novelty for which
 he is usually credited. Blackstone and Mansfield, on this account, were not the match stick
 figures they are sometimes made out to be; the former was not the complacentjurist oblivious
 to the need for reform, and the latter was not the purely instrumentalist, piece meal reformer
 who lacked a sense of system that embraced the most fundamental ideas of common law
 and equity. As Lieberman shows, both Blackstone and Mansfield sought to create a system
 of common law and legislation in which fundamental principles dominated, and wherein
 what was fundamental rested upon a principled melding of custom and reason. Both sought
 to simplify and to prune the law, to make it more widely accessible and acceptable, not only
 for its usefulness, but also for its appeal to an ethically-based and rational embodiment of
 tradition. And both shared the widespread impression that, as things stood, Parliament not
 only lacked the ability to undertake such reform, but was in fact engaged in a legislative
 spree that threatened to obscure - or even destroy - whatever coherence the common law
 still possessed. Neither succeeded in constructing a truly new, "scientific" form of legisla-
 tion; therein lay Bentham's originality, but even Bentham could not have achieved his
 breakthrough without having worked toward it on the basis of the principles (including a
 kind of "science of legislation") of the earlier reform traditions.
 In his analysis of the Commentaries Lieberman argues convincingly that Blackstone's
 passages on parliamentary sovereignty did not render his discussion elsewhere of natural
 law mere "lip-service." We are left, as Lieberman shows, having to reconstruct Blackstone's
 understanding of the dilemma posed by Parliament's de jure sovereignty in a world in which
 truly "good" law had to meet certain ultimate standards. And that reconstruction requires an
 understanding of the role of natural law in Blackstone's "account of common law legitima-
 cy." Of course, the problem of sovereignty melts away if one accepts the will of Parliament
 as necessarily reflecting the ultimate judgment on the true ("natural") principles of English
 law. Blackstone surely understood that point, but he found it difficult to conceive of
 Parliament in that way. Lieberman might have said more on this matter, for which he has
 well laid the foundations. If Blackstone - among many others - thought Parliament incapa-
 ble of creating a coherent system of law, he surely found it difficult to believe that statute
 was of necessity an expression of the very natural law principles upon which he thought
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 such a system must ultimately be based. In the end, Blackstone, as Lieberman states,
 recognized the "evasiveness" of his position (p. 55), and left us an account that we ought
 neither to make more coherent than it was (by not taking his natural law language seriously)
 nor to make less coherent than it was (by losing sight of Blackstone's principled approach
 to distinguishing good from bad common law). Lieberman's analysis of Blackstone's
 "science of legislation" must be read together with the brief but insightful ensuing chapter
 on "Equity, Principle and Precedent." Blackstone saw the common law as both principle and
 precedent; the common law contained its own equitable side, and equity, like the common
 law, was bound by precedent for reasons of stability and expectations. The natural-law
 element of common law is now seen as uniting with equity, which Blackstone did not
 consider an entirely separate system. Judicial "reform" of the law, which (relative to
 Parliament) could amount to a preemptive strike, becomes a model for what legislative
 reform ought to be.
 There was a tension, of course, between Blackstone's adherence to precedent (in com-
 mon-law opinions) for reasons of stability and certainty and his insistence that Parliament
 remove excrescences upon the law that were the unfortunate result of ad hoc historical
 developments. Parliament is adjured to prune away rules that a common law court might
 feel bound to follow in a given case. Too little is said, perhaps, about the difference between
 adjudication of a case at hand in a common law court and alteration of the law, in the abstract
 (as it were), by legislative decree. Nonetheless, taken together, the first three chapters of
 Lieberman's book constitute a remarkable reconstruction of a Blackstonean system of
 jurisprudence that embodied reformist principles, natural law boundaries, and a theory of
 precedent that was in constant tension with both.
 Toward the close of Chapter 3, Lieberman remarks that Mansfield "took precedents to be
 illustrations of those rational principles which were the essence of common law," and he
 argues that "if common law was principle, then the law resembled equity" (pp. 86-87). This,
 Lieberman concludes, was a theory that gave the common law considerable flexibility.
 Subsequent chapters then reveal Mansfield at his most flexible, while making a convincing
 case for his adherence to what he took to be settled common-law principles, or "natural
 principles" upon which the common law ought to be settled. Mansfield's contemporaries
 quite understandably exaggerated the degree to which he departed from the common law
 or- more to Lieberman's point- failed to understand that Mansfield himself believed he
 was remaining within the appropriate bounds of the common law. It should be pointed out
 that if Mansfield's English contemporaries misunderstood what he was attempting to do, so,
 too, did those who viewed him from afar. Jefferson, among others, saw Mansfield as
 dangerous because arbitrary, as a threat to the natural-law (and so, presumably, to the
 immutable) quality of the common law. Lieberman would have much to offer should he turn
 in future work to the American assessment of Mansfield or, for that matter, to the relationship
 between Joseph Story's science of the law (developed in part as a defense against those who
 favored legislative codification) and Mansfield's own (as Lieberman subtly places it)
 anti-legislative theory of common-law reasoning.
 Finally, Lieberman's discussion of Blackstone's more "conservative" approach to prece-
 dent (i.e., more conservative than Mansfield's), is effectively reintroduced. Lieberman
 shows how Bentham seized on this difference in the Fragment, reviling Blackstone for his
 conservatism, and siding with Mansfield, despite the fact that the latter had wanted to scuttle
 precedent to achieve judicial, as opposed to legislative, reform of the common law. The
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 counterpoint among the major characters has by this point become one of the central devices
 of Lieberman's book.
 Lord Kames is a welcome addition to the cast of characters, and to our attempts to
 understand the transition from Blackstone to Bentham. Lieberman's detour northward
 involves a masterly and economical placing of Kames, whose general principles of moral
 and legal development are smoothly set forth; the ironies of the Scottish situation, both
 domestically and in relation to the Westminster-based Parliament, are artfully sketched.
 Kames prefigured Benthamite principles of utility but, quite naturally, looked to the
 bench - not the legislature - as the obvious institution for reform. Lieberman points out that
 Kames practically turned the court of equity into a mini-legislature and shared his
 contemporaries' misreading of Mansfield. This establishes, it seems to me, yet a further
 irony: Mansfield was, in fact, a principled judicial common-law reformer, not a quasi-legisla-
 tor (i.e., not a purely instrumentalist reformer of common law); Kames saw him largely as
 the latter, and so was well disposed toward the process of judge-based reform. Had Kames
 known the true Mansfield, he might - but for the "accidental" reasons that made parliament-
 ary reform of Scottish law most unlikely -have tilted in the other (legislative) direction.
 Having brought the varieties of common-law reform to light - and life - Lieberman turns to
 legislative reform. Here the common lawyers' doubts about legislative tinkering with the
 common law (and about creation of new legal rules generally) reappear, this time through
 the eyes of Daines Barrington. Consolidation and classification ("Baconian" reform) was
 invoked in the period, but little more. Even in penal law the reformist impulse was limited
 to revision of the law of sanctions. Once again, contemporaries' misunderstandings are
 central to the story: Bentham saw in Barrington a real ally and a contrast to Blackstone; in
 fact, Barrington and Blackstone had much in common -Bentham failed to see that Black-
 stone, too, had a prescription for some kind of legislative reform.
 Because Lieberman's concluding chapters on Bentham succeed in placing Bentham in
 relation to those who went before, he is able to characterize and analyze a great deal of
 Bentham's jurisprudence in short compass-truly a tour de force. The transition from
 Bentham's modest science of consolidation and classification to his true science of legisla-
 tion is effectively handled and gains its interest largely from the long-range perspective
 Lieberman has provided. Bentham's critique of common law (really, non-law) is familiar,
 but against the background of all that has gone before, it takes on welcome freshness. It must
 be recalled that Bentham caricatured Blackstone, but, as Lieberman shows, Bentham well
 understood his predecessors' complex and varied arguments regarding the nature of the
 common law (if not always their attitudes toward legislation). Thus, Bentham's (eventual)
 radical anti-common-law position can not be passed off as a reaction against a simplistic
 identification of common law with natural law. It was, this fine book argues, a conscious
 rejection of the far more sophisticated notion of the "reason" of the law that Mansfield and
 others, as well as Blackstone, had set forth.
 University of Michigan THOMAS A. GREEN
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